HLA security through real-time compliance testing by Andrews, David et al.
HLA Security through Real-Time Compliance Testing
David Andrews
Philip Smith
David Stratton
School of Information Technology and Mathematical Sciences
University of Ballarat
PO Box 663, Ballarat, 3353, Victoria, AUSTRALIA
+1 949 633-0588, +61 3 5327 9279
d.andrews, p.smith, d.stratton@ballarat.edu.au
Dr. John Wharington
Maritime Platforms Division
Defence Science Technology Organisation
PO Box 3441V Melbourne, 3001, Victoria, AUSTRALIA
+61 3 9626 8602
john.wharington@dsto.defence.gov.au
Keywords:
HLA, security, security rules, access control, multi-level security
ABSTRACT: The HLA community currently utilises federate compliance testing, to give federate users confi-
dence that the way in which a federate operates is correct. This compliance testing currently involves a series of
manually organised software-based tests, and is performed prior to run-time. This does not cover the possibility
of non-compliance-tested modifications before actual deployment.
Addressing these issues could see the development of compliance testing for HLA federates which is automatically
performed during federate execution. The goal of compliance testing—to ensure that HLA federates conform to
the HLA standards—has strong similarities with the goals of computer security.
This paper critically discusses the concept of automated federate compliance testing, its ability to cover multiple
federate versions, and its application to HLA security.
1 Introduction
The HLA is a distributed simulation infrastructure de-
signed to improve simulation re-use, and reduce sim-
ulation development overheads, through improved in-
teroperability. Thus, the HLA allows the development
of modular simulation components called ‘federates’,
which can then be re-used in different complete sim-
ulations called ‘federations’. The HLA’s communica-
tions coordination software is called the Run-Time In-
frastructure (RTI).
The HLA mandates rules to which all federates must
conform. Compliance with these rules is assessed by
a Certification Agent, such as the HLA Federate Com-
pliance Test Lab in Virginia, USA. Certification Agents
are appointed by the body responsible for the develop-
ment of HLA, the United States Defence Modelling and
Simulation Office (DMSO).
Both current federate compliance testing, and its evo-
lution to deal with the future demands of the HLA sim-
ulation community, are the primary issues discussed in
this paper.
2 Background
This section discusses current federate compliance test-
ing procedures drawing heavily from the descriptions
provided by members of the HLA Federate Compli-
ance Test Lab and the Georgia Tech Research Institute
[7, 11, 4].
The primary goal of the HLA compliance process
is to allow federates to be re-used, and provide some
assurance regarding the correctness of their operation.
Thus, it is important for achieving the primary design
goal of the HLA: improved simulation re-use.
The compliance testing process has two individual
parts: conformance testing and certification. Confor-
mance testing ensures that a federate operates in ac-
cordance with the appropriate HLA standards, while
certification involves guaranteeing that a valid confor-
mance test has been performed on a federate. Thus, a
certified HLA compliant federate has been both confor-
mance tested, and had its test validated.
The most important aspect to the compliance process
is the conformance testing procedure, which is made up
of four steps:
1. Initiation : Federate developer submits a test ap-
plication, and requests information on the testing
process, which the Certification Agent (CA) then
provides.
2. Documentation Testing : Federate developer sub-
mits documentation that reflects the object model
and HLA services employed by the federate. This
documentation is checked for incorrect formatting
and inconsistencies.
3. Organise Run-time Test : Federate developer and
CA swap files necessary to conduct a live test of
the federate, and determine a date and time to con-
duct the test.
4. Live Testing : During a live test of the federate, the
CA tests that the federate fulfils its documented
object model and interface responsibilities.
This procedure is potentially lengthy and halted as it
requires regular correspondence, and is controlled man-
ually.
The live testing for federate conformance is an addi-
tional drawback to the current process, as it is is con-
ducted via the Internet. This requirement raises serious
security concerns, such as the opportunity for unknown
parties to participate in the test federation, and poten-
tially influence its results. This may be unacceptable
to organisations with strict security policies, or in cases
where the system being simulated by the federate is of
a sensitive nature.
Once a federate has successfully passed a confor-
mance test, it is then eligible to be certified as ‘HLA
Compliant’. This certification indicates that the feder-
ate complies with the rules and standards of the HLA.
Importantly however, this compliance refers only for a
single federate version. When the next modification—
however slight—is made, the certification of the feder-
ate is nullified, until the certification process has been
completed again. It is reasonable to assume that feder-
ates will continue to evolve as changes are made, if for
no other reason than to improve fidelity.
Thus, each version of a federate must undergo multi-
ple and ongoing conformance tests and certification, in
order to be recognised as HLA compliant. This means
that if HLA certification is to become common-place,
conformance must be tested not only for every federate,
but for every version of every federate released. While
possible, this could be extremely time-consuming for
Certification Agents.
As HLA becomes more accepted by both commercial
and defence users, and the number of HLA federates
increases, compliance testing processes must likewise
evolve: to facilitate easy and timely testing and certifi-
cation, and maintain the meaningful assurances of cor-
rect federate operation.
This section has highlighted potential issues with cur-
rent conformance testing: time consumption due to the
manual tasks required, and poor security due to uncon-
trolled run-time execution.
3 Automated Compliance Testing
Automated compliance testing offers a potential solu-
tion to the issues with the current compliance testing
procedure. While the certification phase will remain
virtually unchanged, automation of the conformance
testing phase is achievable, and will address the issues
of time consumption and security. Thus, the major
change in automating compliance testing is in achiev-
ing automated conformance testing.
Automated conformance testing could be achieved in
a number of ways. The common characteristic how-
ever, is the automation of the manual steps in the exist-
ing process. A variety of scenarios providing automated
conformance testing are described below:
Pre-Deployment : This scenario involves the automa-
tion of the existing conformance testing and certi-
fication validation processes. This means that the
tasks current performed by humans, which cur-
rently involve organisation and the interpretation
of results, will be conducted automatically.
It is possible in this scenario that Certification
Agents could provide servers accessible by the
simulation community, to which federate develop-
ers can connect and automatically test their HLA
conformance.
This scenario offers the least change to existing
conformance procedures, however does not pro-
vide run-time checks to address run-time confor-
mance issues.
Gradual Trans-Deployment : This scenario involves
the gradual testing of federate conformance while
it is being executed in a live working environment.
Ergo, a federate is only allowed to execute while
its behaviour conforms to the HLA standards. This
requires that the testing process has control of the
interaction between the federate and the RTI.
A possible implementation of this scenario in-
volves the use of interposition techniques, as suc-
cessfully detailed in the DSILI, SecProxy and Ma-
tis projects [10, 3, 2]. This technique provides a
third-party process with full access, to the com-
munication between a federate and the RTI.
In this scenario it is possible that the Certifica-
tion Agents would provide the program to check
and control federate access to the RTI. This CA
software could only be responsible for restricting
federate behaviour when it did not conform to the
HLA standards.
This scenario does allow the opportunity for stren-
uous run-time conformance checking, however has
the disadvantages of a potentially significant per-
formance impact, and little commonality with ex-
isting procedures.
Gradual Re-Testing : This scenario involves aspects
of both Pre-Deployment, and Gradual Trans-
Deployment. Major versions of federates are com-
plied and certified using current procedures, and
these certifications are extended to cover subse-
quent minor versions of federates, provided the
fundamental behaviour is identical.
In this scenario, the current testing procedures
may or may not be automated, however it is
important that some record—model—is made
of the federates behaviour. This record can
then be compared—also using an interposition
technique—to subsequent versions of the federate
during live execution. The interposed process can
refuse federate behaviour if it differs from what
has been certified.
During these comparisons, whether or not the un-
certified federate version conforms to the HLA
standards is not directly tested. Instead, its equal-
ity with the behaviour of a certified federate ver-
sion is tested. Given two federates which exhibit
functionally identical HLA behaviour, and that one
is HLA certified, it is logical that the second feder-
ate also conforms with the HLA standards.
Thus, the conformance of uncertified federate ver-
sions can be tested at run-time, based on the record
of previously certified versions of the same feder-
ate. This run-time testing does not require detailed
and strenuous conformance testing, and thus, re-
duces the effect run-time checking has on federate
performance.
The Gradual Re-Testing (GRT) scenario draws to-
gether positive aspects of the two preceding which
are: current procedures remain in place with min-
imal changes; and the enforced conformance of
federates to the HLA standard during run-time.
The automatic conformance testing scenarios described
are by no means exhaustive; they serve as merely intro-
ductory examples.
The remainder of this paper concentrates on the pro-
posed Gradual Re-Testing (GRT) scenario, as it seems
to offer the best solution to the problem. GRT offers
solutions to the envisaged HLA conformance and certi-
fication problems, while utilising existing processes and
technologies.
4 Gradual Re-Testing Of Confor-
mance
The previous section introduced the concept of Gradual
Re-Testing of a federate’s HLA conformance, this sec-
tion delves further into the topic: discussing the tech-
nologies upon which GRT could be implemented, and
further describing a working scenario.
The requirements for successful GRT primarily stem
from its requirements to both model a federate’s be-
haviour, and to make comparisons between such a
model and an executing federate. These requirements
fall into the category of program behaviour modelling:
a technology which has been thoroughly investigated by
researchers in the field of computer security and—more
specifically—intrusion detection [5, 8, 6, 9].
There are a number of program behaviour modelling
techniques used depending on circumstances, however,
one technique—developed by the author—is aimed at
the succinct modelling of complex programs; specif-
ically, HLA federates. This modelling technique is
termed Logical Entity Abstracted Program Behaviour
Modelling (LEAPBM) [1, 2].
4.1 Logical Entity Abstracted Program
Behaviour Modelling
This section provides a brief discussion on Logi-
cal Entity Abstracted Program Behaviour Modelling
(LEAPBM), and its application to automated HLA con-
formance testing.
As stated, LEAPBM will be used by a GRT imple-
mentation as the basis upon which decisions of a feder-
ate’s HLA conformance are to be made. LEAPBM en-
ables the definition of a program’s behaviour in terms of
user-defined abstract entities. In the case of HLA feder-
ates, these abstract entities logically represent the HLA
objects which they use: federations, object classes, ob-
ject instances, attributes etc. This technique is distinct
from most other program behaviour modelling tech-
niques which base their definitions on a program’s use
of the system kernel.
LEAPBM’s definition happens at a more abstracted
level (E.g. in terms of HLA entities), and has been
shown to provide models that are more precise, more
humanly readable, and efficient.
The LEAPBM technique’s format and processes
have recently been finalised, and future work on the
proposed GRT compliance scenario can begin. Tech-
nical issues concerning the application of LEAPBM to
the GRT scenario still exist:
• Response to a federate breach of conformance by
the controlling process and other federation mem-
bers.
• Requiring the certification of all federation mem-
bers for federation execution.
• Managing federation certification requirements.
4.2 Process Overview
This section provides an overview of the workings of
the proposed GRT process. This process takes place
both before a federate’s deployment in a live execution
environment, and afterwards. Figure 1 outlines the pro-
cess before a federate has been deployed.
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Figure 1: GRT Federate Pre-Deployment
When development of a federate has reached a mile-
stone, in this example Version 1.0, the federate is re-
leased. A release version then undergoes conformance
testing and certified based on current procedures. Af-
ter the federate has been certified—indicated by the
surrounding dotted line—a model of the federate’s be-
haviour is developed. This model is used after the fed-
erate has been deployed, to ensure its behaviour con-
forms to the HLA standards (outlined in Figure 2). This
model continues to be used during minor development
of the federate, until a fundamental change in behaviour
is made.
When a federate is deployed and begins communicat-
ing with the RTI in a federation, its behaviour is guar-
anteed to be in conformance with the HLA standards as
this federate version is certified, again this is indicated
by the dotted line. Figure 3 shows what occurs when
a subsequent, modified version of the federate (Version
1.1) needs to be deployed.
As shown, this modified federate’s functionality is
then restricted to the model of the previous version’s be-
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Figure 2: GRT Federate Post-Deployment
haviour, restricting its behaviour to that which has been
certified. This is achieved using an interposing piece of
software which, as previously stated, gives it control of
the communications between federate and RTI. The in-
terposing software’s task is to ensure that whatever ver-
sion of the federate is running, its essential behaviour is
identical to that of the certified federate. Thus, an asser-
tion regarding this modified federate’s conformance is
possible when its behaviour is restricted to a pre-tested
behaviour model. Figure 3 represents this by dotted line
which surrounds both the federate and the interposing
model-enforcer.
In this manner, minor and on-going federate devel-
opment may proceed while conformance to the HLA
standards is ensured. This means that new versions of
federates that are functionally identical to already certi-
fied versions, do not require re-certification. Given that
as a federate evolves it is unlikely to under-go major
functional modifications often, the amount of federate
versions which need to under-go the length certification
process is drastically reduced.
4.3 Advantages
Adopting a GRT-based conformance testing scenario
should result in the following benefits for the HLA com-
munity:
1. Increased user confidence in the correct operation
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Figure 3: GRT Modified Federate Deployment
of HLA federates.
2. Reduced overhead for federate developers to main-
tain HLA certification of their federates.
3. Minimal procedural and infrastructural changes.
4. Advantageous basis for future HLA security devel-
opments.
5 HLA Security
This section describes the impact of GRT automated
conformance testing on HLA security. GRT has a sig-
nificant potential impact on HLA security, due to the
enforcement of a program behaviour model. The intro-
duction of additional processing, with full control over a
federates interaction with a federation, provides an ideal
location for the enforcement of security policies.
Security policies need to be in place to protect indi-
vidual federate users. This need is born from the inter-
operative and distributed nature of the HLA, that poten-
tially each federate user may be at a different location,
and that each user might have little assurance regard-
ing the proper behaviour of other federate users. To
this end, interposing software at each location can al-
low communication between federate users, to facilitate
peer decision-making on the definition and enforcement
of security policies. As an example, the group of feder-
ates in a federation could define a policy dictating which
federates are allowed to gain access to the information
used within the federation.
6 Future Directions
The concepts discussed in this paper: GRT and its ap-
plication to ensuring HLA security, will in the future
be implemented and explored. Experimentation with
different automated conformance testing scenarios will
aim to discover the individual characteristics of each,
and the deployment situations whose requirements they
best fulfil. For example, in a situation where deploy-
ment will occur entirely within a highly secure envi-
ronment, the additional performance overhead of auto-
mated conformance testing may be redundant.
In addition, this future work will produce a list of
recommendations to the Defence Modelling and Sim-
ulation Office about changes to the HLA standard in-
terface. These recommendations will be targeted at
drawing the automated conformance testing and secu-
rity functionality in to the RTI itself, thus becoming part
of a future HLA standard.
7 Conclusion
The Gradual Re-Testing automation scenario aims to
improve conformance testing and certification to meet
the needs of the HLA community into the future.
This is achieved through the use of existing testing
procedures—which are conducted prior to a federate’s
deployment—and the addition of fast run-time checks,
which ensure that all future federate versions conform
to the HLA standards. Future experimentation will as-
sess the degree to which these needs are met.
Aside from the previously mentioned technical issues
which remain to be worked through, the main issue with
GRT based conformance and certification procedures is
the introduction of an additional controlling process. It
is unreasonable to expect the simulation community to
trust such a process, unless some control over its de-
velopment is taken by an authoritative body, such as
DMSO.
This problem might also be solved by integrating this
additional behaviour into the HLA standard, thus mak-
ing the RTI responsible for ensuring that federate inter-
action is controlled and importantly, that each federate
is aware of the status of the others. However this neces-
sitates alterations to the HLA interface standard.
This paper has outlined a concept for the evolution
of HLA conformance and certification procedures to
provide a better service to federate developers, and
improved security to federate users. For more in-
formation on this please visit the University of Bal-
larat Distributed Simulation Laboratory website at:
http://dsl.ballarat.edu.au, or contact the author.
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